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A Green Blanchot: Impossible?
TIMOTHY CLARK
Abstract:
Blanchot’s work may at first seem remote from any sort of environmentalist
thinking. While elements of his work share with Levinas and Heidegger a
problematic privileging of the human, Blanchot nevertheless offers the basis
of what might be seen as a timely ‘deeper ecological’ thinking, one that can
engage the destructive anthropocentrism of Western thought and tradition
in the very minutiae of its literary and philosophical texts. Unlike in much
‘green’ philosophy, no concept of nature or earth serves as foundation for
Blanchot’s thought. He is engaged by the ‘impossible’ as that which is not
a matter of human power or decision, affirmed in both its ethical force and
its contestation of dominant and appropriative conceptions of knowledge,
rationality and invention. A comparison is offered between Max Oelschlager’s
representative ecocritical essay ‘Earth-Talk: Conservation and Ecology’, with
its romantic attempt to find and celebrate modes of unalienated or ‘natural’
language, and Blanchot’s practice of what can be seen as a more radical and
questioning ‘ecology’ based on almost opposite conceptions.
Keywords:Blanchot, nature, impossible, deep ecology, physis, animal, anthro-
pocentrism, ethics, environmentalism
Blanchot’s work belongs with that of Martin Heidegger and Friedrich
Nietzsche in locating the sources of many of the crises facing Western
humanity, and now humanity in general, in deep ontological presup-
positions, pervasive habits of thinking that are inherently aggressive or
rapacious. Yet unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger, both of whom thema-
tize the ‘earth’ in ways that have inspired environmentalist thinkers,
Blanchot’s work seems at first remote from anything recognisably like
green issues.
Partly, no doubt, out of a reaction against pseudo-agrarian elements
in Heidegger’s work, Blanchot’s writing, with its overwhelmingly
urban climate, affirms a kind of anti-essentialist nomadism, refusing all
forms of nostalgia and insidious notions of ‘rootedness’. This cannot
but set Blanchot challengingly against much that might seem attractive
yet finally unacceptable in much environmentalist thought with terms
like ‘nature’ and ‘the earth’. That granted, it is very striking how,
compared to almost any page of Heidegger or Nietzsche, Blanchot’s
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writing is almost totally void of references to or images from the
natural world. One might even imagine, reading Blanchot’s oeuvre,
that humanity and its artifacts were in sole possession of the Earth. His
considerable body of work on Rilke barely takes up the issue of that
poet’s attention to the mode of being of animals, even when that is
the explicit topic of a poem being cited (‘Duino Elegy, 8’).1 To work
through one end of The Writing of the Disaster (1980) to the other
looking for any reference to non-human life is to find nothing, bar
one anti-natural figure (‘A rose blossoming into a bud’). After a striking
passage at the end of Thomas the Obscure does any bird ever fly across
a page of Blanchot?2
This essay tries to address the seeming absence in Blanchot of
what is increasingly seen as an epochal issue— the crisis in human
self-conceptions being wrought by the intensifying degradation of the
planet itself. How far can Blanchot’s thinking, his famous refusal of
the present, encompass this issue?
Global Responsibility
One evident connection between environmentalist thinkers and Blan-
chot’s work lies in the attention both give to the unprecedented nature
of the contemporary world as one in which humanity, become truly
global, enters an era of risk and self-questioning. Blanchot’s medi-
tations often show a planetary awareness, one that we would now
associate with ‘globalization’, but which Blanchot described in relation
to claims about the ‘end of history’ or, as below, to the thought of
Teilhard de Chardin. He writes:
we have entered the final and critical stage in which economic, technical, ethical,
scientific, artistic, and spiritual expansion carries humanity ‘to the heart of an
always accelerated vortex of totalization upon itself’ [de Chardin].3
Such a sense of the world as a whole is now so commonplace that its
distinctiveness is easily forgotten (so that we think nothing of passing
in the course of a single conversation from African politics to Japanese
technology to Irish music):
The words world civilization, universal domination, planetization, collective cerebral-
ization are expressed or inferred in everything that we say and think. Each
person sees himself as master of the entire earth and of all that has existed on
earth. (F, 73)
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This global consciousness, while conducive to fantasies of human
mastery, is also an existential dilemma. Blanchot is very much a thinker
of the paradoxy and crises of thought induced by the need to
think human existence as a whole (ultimately in its finitude and
powerlessness), as opposed to analytic tasks of ‘understanding’ directed
towards specific issues with a view to enhancing a sense of human
power over things. The global ecological crisis could be called precisely
‘Blanchotian’ in its demand that we think increasingly, not in terms
of regional projects of management or conservation within received
frameworks of thought, but anew about the totality of human life. As
in Blanchot’s essay on the atomic bomb (F, 101–8), the issue becomes
to rethink ‘humanity’ as a question, a ‘who?’
Blanchot’s work overall offers a striking account of the kinds of
conceptual and psychic forces that currently structure the minutiae
of human thought and relations. His work as a critic attends in
minute detail to how even seemingly common-sensical practices of
reading, interpretation, and assumptions about knowledge as inher-
ently synthetic, conceptual and systematizing etc., all link to global
systems of political/social violence. Blanchot writes:
Even comprehension (. . .) is a grasp that gathers the diverse into unity, identifies
the different, and brings the other back to the same through a reduction
that dialectical movement, after a long trajectory, makes coincide with an
overcoming. All these words—grasp, identification, reduction—conceal within
themselves the rendering of accounts that exists in knowledge as its measure:
reason must be given. What is to be known— the unknown—must surrender
to the known.4
Insofar as these issues play themselves out in relation to the minutest
attention to issues of reading and language in numerous texts, Blan-
chot’s work as a critic could be said to practise a kind of micro-ecology
(‘think globally, act locally’).
The issue of wrongs done to other living creatures and of the fini-
tude of the earth itself remains mostly latent here. Nevertheless, the
seeming opacity and resistance of Blanchot’s work to ‘environmen-
talist’ issues may, paradoxically, form a challenge full of intellectual
promise. Ultimately, Blanchot’s work may adumbrate a thinking that
meets one of the most urgent demands of post-enlightenment thought,
that is, resources towards a re-enchantment of the natural world that
would not at the same time be a kind of mystification, evasion or
deception.
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Blanchot’s Neo-anthropocentrism (1)
The seemingly minor status of the natural world as an issue in Blanchot
may lie partly in what might be nicknamed his neo-anthropocentrism,
a term that is meant more descriptively than pejoratively. This is his
version of the argument, derived from Heidegger and re-inflected by
Emmanuel Levinas, on the uniqueness of the human compared to the
rest of nature.
Blanchot’s attention is to the uniqueness of the immediate human
environment— the realm of the sign and image, the mediation of
the space of language—considered not in terms of the positivity of
‘culture’ but as a kind of rupture in being, without nostalgia for some
supposed lost relation to ‘nature’. He moves outside those concepts
of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ whose pas de deux has long dominated
environmentalist and much other discourse in the West (those about
‘art’ and the ‘animal’ for instance). A striking essay in this respect is
‘The Birth of Art’ (F, 1–11) on prehistoric cave painting and the
emergence of modern human beings. Blanchot’s fascination with pre-
history (involving the uncanny fact that other species of human being
have existed and disappeared) correlates with what Stuart Kendall
writes of Georges Bataille in this context: ‘Prehistory is universal
history par excellence because it is not merely the history of the West;
it is global in its sweep and implications.’5
Blanchot describes a double movement of distinction between the
modern human and the animal. First is the emergence of technology
along with some sort of social structure and the prohibitions and
taboos that accompany it:
pre-man fortuitously does violence to the natural givens, stands erect, rises up
against himself, (. . .) becomes an animal raised by himself, works, and becomes
thus something not natural, as far from what is natural as are the prohibitions that
limit what he is in order to benefit what he can be. (F, 6)
This last point recalls numerous thinkers in defining the animal/human
distinction in terms of the emergence of ‘culture’ through determinants
to behaviour based on taboos. Human social organization involves the
deferral and repression of the immediate individual impulse in view of
the greater benefits of cooperative work and power over wild nature.
This initial ‘separation between man and animal’ (F, 6), however,
does not suffice to make early humans into truly fellow creatures of
ours. The modern human being is no animal rationale. A second step is
called for. What is uniquely (modern) human according to Blanchot,
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following Bataille, is not only the power to create ritual, laws, and
prohibitions and tools, but symbolically to transgress or destroy them.
It is that freedom to negate, the power of beginning again, to abolish
the real into the empty space of images and signs. For Blanchot, the
emergence of modern humanity is indissociable here from that of
language and ‘art’ (in the broadest sense of the creation of images and
non-utilitarian designs). Here:
the gap between man and his origin is put into question once again and in
some sense recovered, explored, and experienced: a prodigious contact with all
of anterior reality (and first with animal reality) and thus a return to the first
immensity, but a return that is always more than a return, for he who returns,
although his movement gives him the illusion of abolishing millions of years of
bondage, of submission, and weakness, also becomes tumultuously conscious of
this impossible return, becomes conscious of the limits and the unique force that
allows him to break these limits, does not simply lose himself in the dream of total
existence but instead affirms himself as that which is added to this existence and
(. . .) can appropriate it symbolically or communicate with it by making it be. (F, 6)
The essay on the caves of Lascaux affirms that art and modern
humanity are coeval, born in a common double break from the
natural world. Blanchot concludes: ‘Art would thus provide us with
our only authentic date of birth’ (F, 7).
Blanchot also repeats the claim— still in dispute6 — that Nean-
derthals had no art and that this corresponded to their radical difference
from modern people. Only the latter stand in their existence amidst a
realm of non-being, that of the image, of detachment from positivity,
or can choose ‘to stand on the inside or the outside of being as
non-presence’ (F, 9). So the disjunction between modern humanity
and the rest of the natural world includes even another human species.
It is as ‘if the division of human possibilities (. . .) were in some sense
determined by an exigency having little to do with the movement
of evolution’ (F, 9) for, Blanchot observes, evolution was clearly
as likely as not to produce a humanity without art, ‘freedom’ or
‘discontinuity’, but still endowed with tools, fire, clothing and instru-
ments of communication, etc. Only modern people, not the extinct
Neanderthals, could be called Dasein in Heidegger’s sense of beings
transcending positivity, one whose being is continually an issue for it.
Art’s seeming timelessness, Blanchot argues elsewhere, ‘alludes only
to the power that we have of putting an end to the world, of standing
before or after the world’ (F, 33). It is as if there were latent in
even the earliest cave art those epochal 1960s images of the earth
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from space, the fragile mottled sphere hanging in an unimaginable
emptiness, images now forever associated with an emerging ecological
consciousness. ‘This is why’, Blanchot continues, ‘art is tied to all that
puts man in danger, to everything that puts him violently outside the
world, outside the security and intelligence of the world to which
only the future belongs’ (F, 33).
It cannot for any human being be a matter of leaving this third space,
only of inhabiting and reconfiguring it in less violent ways. Any notion
of a ‘return’ to some lost natural ‘harmony’ is intelligible to a reader
of Blanchot only as an incoherence of thought. Hence Blanchot’s
remorseless arguments against all kinds of romantic nostalgia, the use
of art (‘an unreal thing in the world outside the world’ (IC, 382)) for
purposes of reconciliation with some supposedly ‘lost’ nature, some
group or ethnic identity or allegiance or deeper life.
This is a Blanchot who cannot but be pitted against vast stretches
of environmentalist thought, based as it usually is on a romantic
programme of ‘reconnection’ with ‘nature’ or ‘the earth’. Ultimately,
however, Blanchot may offer a way of articulating global environ-
mental crisis in terms that do not ultimately rest on forced claims of
some lost ‘kinship’ and ‘reciprocity’ with nature.
Blanchot’s Neo-anthropocentrism (2)
First, however, it is necessary to turn to some more problematic
aspects of Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism.
His meditative dialogues and essays often turn around the issue
of modes for self-understanding that would enable human life to be
thought without reference to illusory moral or metaphysical anchors,
in ‘God’, ‘nature’, or seemingly self-evident ‘values’. Kevin Hart has
written of the importance of an ethics of the human relation in
Blanchot’s work overall, read as an attempt to ‘preserve the sacred
without religion’ (206): ‘To lose faith that life has an overarching
meaning is not to dismiss mystery; it is to recognize that the human
relation is mysterious, that the legitimate processes of demystification
cannot find traction there.’7 Should this exclusive focus on ‘the
human’ be accepted? Among such a wealth of living things and places
is there really no other resistance to demystification? Is ‘nothing (. . .)
more strange than the human relation’ (DG, 17)? To turn back to
Blanchot’s pages is to find that the ethical relation, such as he engages
it after Levinas, seems entirely and exclusively a matter only of one
human being to another.
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The central claim of Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism lies in the
unique breach that art and language make within the positivity of
being. This realm of ‘discontinuity’ underlies Blanchot’s reworking
of an ethics of autrui that both looks to and revises Levinas. It is
crucial that autrui speaks. ‘Autrui speaks to me’ (IC, 55). Blanchot
defines autrui through the radical inflection which language may bring
to the relation of one human being to another: ‘the recognition of the
common strangeness that does not allow us to speak of our friends but only
to speak to them’ (F, 291). At issue is the affirmation of ‘a separation
that is presupposed—not surmounted, but confirmed— in all true
speech’ (IC, 55; emphasis added), the lack of commonality between
those who express themselves. Blanchot’s appeal here is a norm of
‘true’ speech that seeks to let speak the very ‘separation’, rather than
drive to accommodate both speakers within a shared identity, cultural
horizon, common values, etc. The ‘double dissymmetry’ of the human
relation— its refusal of linear geometry— lies in the fact that if the
other (autrui) is never a self for me, even as he or she also transcends
phenomenology, then the reverse is also true, but not in a dialectical
fashion, for there is no symmetry that could become the foundation
for a ‘we’, a common identity or platform.
Clearly, however, in positing that the emergence of the human and
this affirmation of a space of discontinuity constitute the same event,
Blanchot’s argument about autrui must move within the presupposed
circle of a sharedDasein. Only within someminimal kind of reciprocity
between speakers is Blanchot’s norm thinkable, affirming an infraction
into the realm of shared terms, references and concepts that make up
language. The ‘double dissymmetry’ remains essentially and necessarily
symmetrical even as it maintains an infinity whereby one human being
can never be an object or an intentional correlate of the other. The
realm of the ethical seems exclusively human.
However, other aspects of Blanchot’s argument implicitly desta-
bilize his anthropocentrism. In this third space outside terms of
equivalence and identity the human speakers may come to recognize
in impossibility our most human belonging to immediate human life, the life that
it falls to us to sustain each time that, stripped through misfortune of the clothed
forms of power, we reach the nakedness of every relation: that is to say, the
relation to naked presence, the presence of the other. (IC, 47)
Blanchot’s focus is on what remains of the human relation when
stripped of all positivities of given identity or cultural belonging. This
leads him, supposing himself forced to ‘choose [his] ideology’, to give
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allegiance to a revised notion of ‘humanism’— the humanism of ‘the
cry— that is to say, the murmur; cry of need or of protest, cry without
words and without silence, an ignoble cry’ (IC, 262).
A reduction to the most basic, stripped ‘humanness’— the helpless
appeal of a complete vulnerability— this is what Blanchot sees in
the victims of the concentration camps: ‘human existence pure and
simple, lived as lack at the level of need’ (IC, 133). So, in a sense, it is in
the acultural, deprived condition of being reduced to a quasi ‘animal’
existence, one might say, that the true claim of humanness becomes
manifest, an ethical claim which no power can abolish. This ‘man
reduced to the irreducible’ (IC, 133) cries out in the ethical appeal
that the other makes to me, not only ‘as though this Self were in my
place, but [also to] become responsible for it by recognizing in it an
injustice committed against everyone’ (IC, 134). This is where some
kind of re-entry of the other into the realm of ‘dialectical struggle’
(IC, 134), social identities and moral norms, systems of justice, etc.,
must occur. The sense of an ‘injustice committed against everyone’
may acquire, in court, the legal status of a ‘crime against humanity’.
However it is at just this same Kantian point—of a universalization
that sees in the one wrong a wrong committed against all— that
the question of the human/animal distinction again becomes urgent
and destabilizing. In relation to the suffering of a creature of another
species, Blanchot’s ‘humanism’ becomes problematic. How can I
think ‘as though this Self were in my place’, and how can that sense of
suffering become then the basis of an appeal to all who could likewise
suffer? Who could ‘all’ or ‘everyone’ be within such a situation? It
could surely never include, for instance, the stoat that needs to have
killed that leveret in order to eat? Here no kind of broader ‘society’
exists into which the naked appeal of suffering can be taken up.
Blanchot’s argument on the autrui and the human relation attempts
to hold together two separate issues. One is the ethical claim of
vulnerability, the cry of another’s suffering. The other is the disruption
of autrui within language taken as a horizon of equivalence, the refusal
to be embraced within the horizon of given categories and identities
and the challenge of a neutral space that escapes their purchase.
These two arguments dovetail into each other forcefully in Blanchot’s
text, but they only do so if one assumes that the relation at issue is
exclusively that of one human being to another. However, the issue of
non-human suffering, vast and incalculable as it is, can make Blanchot’s
use of the term autrui look clumsy. Only within a presupposed horizon
of a common belonging to modern humanity (or Dasein) does it make
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sense to use it, as Blanchot does, to name at once both a refusal
of given terms and identities, in the name of the otherness of the
other, and the powerlessness of the ethical appeal of vulnerability and
suffering.
The following paragraph exemplifies another problematic part of
Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism. An interlocutor in a dialogue in
The Infinite Conversation argues, on the topic of the autrui, the other
(person):
[Man] alone is the unknown, he alone the other, and in this he would be presence:
such is man (. . .). Each time we project strangeness onto a non-human being or
refer the movement of the unknown back to the universe, we disburden ourselves
of the weight of man. We sometimes imagine in a very impoverished fashion our
frightened encounter in the sky of the planets and the stars with a different and
superior being, and we ask ourselves: what would happen? A question to which
we can perfectly well respond, for this being has always been there: it is man,
man whose presence gives us all measure of strangeness. (IC, 60)
The argument here may seem unacceptably extreme, nor is it really
qualified later in the dialogue. Are the sea, the stars, the forests really
to be allowed no ‘strangeness’ but that which they reflect back from
the human face? Even given innumerable qualifications well known
to readers of Blanchot, that would still be a kind of ‘deification’ of the
human.8
However, Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism may also contain some
surprising resources. Elsewhere, it is not a matter of humanity forming
alone ‘the unknown’ or ‘strange’, but rather of the human relation as
revealing such dimensions of existence more generally, giving access
to a comparable sense of singularity in the realm of other creatures
and things.
Blanchot’s micro-ecological thinking concerns both a form of poli-
tics that is not a quest for power and kinds of knowledge and language
that would not be a mode of synthetic force. Blanchot challenges the
presupposition that being consists fundamentally in a unity, one which
conveniently corresponds with notions of knowledge as conceptual
synthesis. He surmises: ‘why should not man, supposing that the
discontinuous is proper to him and is his work, reveal that the ground
of things—to which he must surely in some way belong—has as much
to do with the demand of discontinuity as it does with that of unity?’
(IC, 9). In other words, being cannot finally be correlated with that
drive in human knowledge to synthesize, unify, and to explain under
the aegis of a system of governing concepts. Singularity, disunity,
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opacity and the incalculable are ‘fundamental’ to the ultimate nature
of things. The human relation remains the unavoidable mode of access
to this issue, but is not the sole bearer of such singularity (IC, 10).
Impossibility, Physis, Nature
One of Blanchot’s rare references to the natural world in The Infi-
nite Conversation pivots on its very ‘meaninglessness’: ‘[A]ll modern
humanism’, writes Blanchot, ‘the work of science, and planetary
development have as their object a dissatisfaction with what is, and
thus the desire to transform being— to negate it in order to derive
power from it and to make of this power to negate the infinite move-
ment of human mastery.’ Thus anything (such as Bataille’s notion of
‘interior experience’) which annuls the scope of conceptualization and
human power ‘lays waste at one stroke to our attempts to dominate the
earth and to free ourselves from nature by giving it a meaning— that
is, by denaturing it’ (IC, 149).
Human aggression against the indifference of nature is also a denial
of death. Reading so much of Western thought as the attempt to
make death ‘possible’, that is, part of the realm of human power
and meaning, aligns Blanchot with innumerable thinkers in the deep
ecology movement for whom such denial underlies the planetary
directives of techno-science to command nature and all its resources.9
As Blanchot suggests, the necessity to which ‘everything in the world
submits’ is death; or rather it is
the refusal of death— the temptation of the eternal, all that leads men to prepare
a space of permanence where truth, even if it should perish, may be restored to
life. The concept (therefore all language) is the instrument in this enterprise of
establishing a secure reign. (IC, 33)
By describing something as ‘impossible’, then, Blanchot means not
that it cannot exist, but that its existence is not the effect of any
human power, decision or intention. ‘Impossibility’, writes Blanchot,
is ‘a relation escaping power’ (IC, 38). In this sense, of course, all
the basic dimensions of existence—birth, health, death, needs and
passions, and the immediate recalcitrance of things— are impossible.
Human beings cannot ultimately command them. The impossible is
‘our ultimate dimension’ (IC, 48) and ‘impossibility is being itself’
(IC, 47). Being alive is itself ‘impossible’ in Blanchot’s sense!
Strange though it may sound at first, much of Blanchot’s concept
of ‘the impossible’ correlates with the Aristotelian sense of physis
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in Heidegger’s reading ‘On the Essence and Concept of Physis in
Aristotle’s Physics B, I’ (1939).10 (Heidegger’s essay also begins by
citing exactly the same poem by Ho¨lderlin that will be prominent in
Blanchot’s essay on poetry and the impossible (IC, 38–48)). Physis
is the term inadequately translated as ‘nature’. It is that fundamental
self-originating, ordering and resting of things within which all human
life finds itself. It cannot be fully conceptualised, for it cannot even be
thought without having been presupposed: ‘Whatever produces itself,
i.e. places itself into its appearance, needs no fabrication. If it did, this
would mean an animal could not reproduce itself without mastering
the science of its own zoology’ (Pathmarks, 222).
Compare Blanchot on ‘impossibility’: ‘impossibility [is] that in
which one is always already engaged through an experience more
initial than any initiative, forestalling all beginning and excluding any
movement of action to disengage from it’ (IC, 46).
A thinking of physis then is implicit in Blanchot’s account of
‘impossibility’ both as being and as that in being which must precede
ontology, since it cannot be negated. The switch in terminology
from ‘physis’ or ‘nature’ to ‘the impossible’ might seem partly a
mark of Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism (as well as of the influence
of Bataille’s The Impossible).11 Being as impossibility is characterised
entirely in terms of its relation to the human—one of non-power!
To denominate everything in the universe outside human power ‘the
impossible’ may seem merely the inverse of a hopelessly megalomaniac
human-centred metaphysics. However, Blanchot, in affirming ‘the
impossible’, is foregrounding just that element of so much Western
thought.
The notion of physis is crucial in Blanchot’s reading of the poetry
of Rene´ Char. There is even a sense in which Blanchot is almost too
eager to skip over ‘nature’ in the sense of individual creatures and
things in favour of physis generally:
Nature has a powerful hold over [Char’s] work, but nature does not only mean all
terrestrial objects, or the sun, or the oceans, or the wisdom of enduring men; it is
not even all things together, not the plenitude of the universe, nor the infinity of
the cosmos, but that which already precedes ‘the whole’, is immediate and very
distant, is more real than all real things and lies forgotten in every thing, the bond
that cannot be bound and by which everything, the whole, is bound. Nature, in
the work of Rene´ Char, is this exposure to the origin.12
A major question can be posed at this point. Is there then
an analogy between the original underlying meaninglessness of
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nature—unnegatable, chastening of all human self-aggrandisement—
and an element of art, Char’s poetry for instance, with its own ordeal
of another kind of powerlessness and contestation? As we have seen,
in the emergence of art, prehistoric man found ‘a prodigious contact
with all of anterior reality (and first with animal reality) and thus a
return to the first immensity’.
This seeming analogy would make Blanchot look close to that
post-Kantian tradition of aesthetics which understands the peculiarity
of the achieved work of art by reference to something similar in
natural phenomena. For Blanchot, however, the impossibility of art
inheres in its constitutive breach from the natural world, as in the
moment of cave art. The break is a jump, one not explicable in terms
of laws governing natural phenomena, even those of evolution. The
‘impossibility’ of art cannot be merely identified with the ultimate
‘impossibility’ of natural phenomena.
A better summary formulation of the relation might be this: whereas
Heidegger may attribute to art a potential grounding role in human
affairs, for Blanchot the impossibility in art and language may highlight
that contestation of all anthropocentrism inherent in physis and natural
phenomena. To make this issue more concrete let us turn to another
of the rare occasions on which Blanchot uses an image from the
natural world. Early in The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot contrasts
two simple modes of expression:
‘The sky is blue’, ‘Is the sky blue? Yes.’ One need be no great scholar to recognize
what separates them. The ‘Yes’ does not at all restore the simplicity of the flat
affirmation; in the question the blue of the sky has given way to the void. The
blue, however, has not dissipated. On the contrary, it has been raised dramatically
up to its possibility: beyond its being and unfolding in the intensity of this new
space, certainly more blue than it has ever been, in a more intimate relation
with the sky, in the instant— the instant of the question where everything is in
instancy. Yet hardly is the Yes pronounced, and even as it confirms in its new
brilliance the blue of the sky brought into intimacy with the void, we become
aware of what has been lost. Transformed for an instant into pure possibility, the
state of things does not return to what it was. (IC, 12–13)
The question affirms ‘the gift and the richness of possibility’ (IC, 13),
‘gift’ being effectively synonymous here with the impossibility of
nature. This is perhaps a simple instance of the ‘human relation’
bearing upon a natural phenomenon, against the ‘void’ of outer space
as effectively human space, in such a way as to foreground the sky
in its instancy and singularity. In the seemingly trivial grammar of a
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question, Blanchot traces ‘the illuminating force that brings being to
the fore’ (IC, 13).
Blanchot argues that Char’s practice of a fragmentary, non-synthetic
writing may adumbrate an irenic language, one that would preserve
the unknown as unknown. On Char’s ‘fragmentary’ and paratactic
mode of writing we read:
Speech as archipelago: cut up into the diversity of its islands and thus causing a
surging of the great open sea; this ancient immensity, the unknown always still to
come, designated for us by the emergence of the earth’s infinitely divided depths.
(IC, 309)
The subject of this extended metaphor is speech or language. This
is being compared to nature as physis or origin in the guise of ‘the
great open sea’ and the ‘emergence of the earth’s infinitely divided
depths’. This is not the familiar romantic position, however, that art
or language and nature are analogous. The force of language inheres
here in its action of breaking away and breaking apart: ‘Speech as
archipelago: cut up into the diversity of its islands’. This diversity of
fragmentation and dispersal is said to cause ‘a surging of the great
open sea’ and of ‘the unknown always still to come’. Language,
then, is not a second-order physis. It enacts and affirms humanity’s
constitutive breach with nature and yet, in the process, also unblocks
what is singular and non-synthetic more generally in relation to the
emergence of unpredictable possibilities. In this way, one might say
that the element of the unknown, first apparent in the human relation,
becomes generalized through a kind of return without return to that
‘first immensity’. Thus ‘man, supposing that the discontinuous is
proper to him and is his work, reveal[s] that the ground of things (. . .)
has much to do with the demand of discontinuity as it does with that
of unity’ (IC, 9).13
It is in the third realm of language that a different and irenic relation
to things lies latent, as well as a different relation to other sentient
beings. (‘Reality without the dislocating energy of poetry, what would
that be?’ (Char).14) Such language may effect a force of contestation
and un-meaning which may re-enchant natural phenomena through
an intensification of the sense of their otherness and giftedness.
Environmentalist thinkers often draw attention (like Blanchot) to
the destructive effects of current paradigms of knowledge as ideally
‘objective’, mathematically quantifiable and decontextualized, a model
that transforms reality into a homogenous set of formally expressed
relations. Against this, Blanchot’s work offers a detailed reflection on
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modes of thought and language that enable an irenic and irreplaceable
singularization, discontinuity and openness, one irreconcilable with
received modes of coherence, synthesis, logical consequence and
‘development’:
A developed thought is a reasonable thought; it is also, I would add, a political
thought, for the generality it strives for is that of the universal State when there
will be no more private truth and when everything that exists will submit to a
common denominator. (IC, 339)
‘Poetry: dispersion that, as such, finds its form’ (IC, 360). Such issues
are at work even in that blend of the elusive and intense lucidity that
forms the allure of Blanchot’s ‘style’. Its quality is that of the limpidity
of swift streaming water, at once both monotonous and always fresh.
Blanchot’s deeper ecology?
Blanchot’s micro-ecology moves to identify and counter the kinds of
conceptual violence inherent even in the most seemingly common-
sensical or innocent modes of thought or speech. Were one to try to
align this side of Blanchot’s work with any contemporary school of
environmentalist thought it would surely be with those ‘eco-feminists’
and ‘social ecologists’ who trace humanity’s rapacious attitude to the
natural world to the violence that predominates in relations between
human beings themselves. Verena Conley, for instance, writes:
The destructive urge of our culture can be linked with a patriarchy that organizes
society according to a sexual model that is in fact a martial model. This martial
model has its correlative in the economic model of competition and consumption
that, while benefiting a few, has led to much of the planet’s degradation.15
Nevertheless, almost all work in environmentalist philosophy and
ethics would also be vulnerable to a Blanchot-style deeper ecology. A
good instance of the kind of romantic position that Blanchot’s work
undermines is Max Oelschlager’s essay, ‘Earth-Talk: Conservation and
the Ecology of Language’.16 Oelschlager’s text shares with Blanchot
traces of Heidegger’s influence as well as a common attention to
language as a decisive human environment. For both, a change in
conceptions of language is essential to any fundamental shift in how
human beings conceive themselves. Oelschalger argues that even the
very terms ‘environment’ and ‘environmentalist’ enact the presump-
tion that humanity stands centre stage in a drama of one, surrounded
by its ‘environment’ as a kind of scenery. It is at this point, however,
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that Oelschlager moves into familiar romantic territory, idealizing
‘primary cultures’ without literacy and writing as enacting a truer,
supposedly non-dualistic understanding of the human relation to the
natural world: ‘it is through language generally, and through literacy
more particularly, that we have been alienated from the first world’
(51). Oelschlager addresses the nature/culture dichotomy split by an
argument familiar to literary specialists since the time of the high
romantic poets, for ‘it is also through language that we can return’
(51). He praises the literary practice of Gary Snyder and ‘earth talk’ as
modes of language that understand human beings non-dualistically, as
part and not master of a habitat. Oelschlager asks that we be attentive
to the way ‘primary oral cultures have allowed the flora and fauna ‘‘to
speak’’ ’ (52).
The contrast with Blanchot could not be stronger. The issue for
him is not to overcome some mind/nature dualism through a more
‘natural’ kind of language, but to intensify the very ‘discontinuity’
and interruption in being which the ‘human relation’, as it is borne in
language, poses and is posed by. This produces some very different if
still generally positive readings of some pre- or non-scientific modes
of language (for example, the words of Heraclitus (IC, 85–92)). The
human relation, borne in language, holds open a discontinuity in
being more generally— an un-meaning and wildness that cannot be
contained by given concepts of unity, synthesis or by that ‘knowledge’
which has almost always been defined by such principles.
Blanchot affirms the disturbing yet irenic force of this worklessness,
as in the following fragment from The Step Not Beyond. This brings
a strange twist to the familiar romantic topoi of the garden and lost
childhood:
All words are adult. Only the space in which they reverberate— a space infinitely
empty, like a garden where, even after the children have disappeared, their joyful
cries continue to be heard— leads them back towards the perpetual death in
which they seem to keep being born.17
Strikingly, it is the already lost status of Eden that emerges here as
the principle of ‘beginning’. A language exposed to its own finitude
and the violence of the break from the immediate is also one held
anew in the space of its own genesis. What is the force of this
strange simile for the space in which a word or words reverberate:
‘like a garden where, even after the children have disappeared, their
joyful cries continue to be heard’? This movement of unworking
in the language, considered as the constitutive human environment,
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becomes, through the acknowledgement of finitude and evanescence,
an irenic affirmation of ‘impossibility’ as a force of beginning. The
reference to children recalls the concept of ‘natality’ in Hannah
Arendt’s sense, that ‘with each birth something uniquely new comes
into the world’.18 This strange space, whose cold fecundity inheres
in its very finitude, stands in Blanchot’s work in place of Ho¨lderlin’s
‘Nature’, Heidegger’s ‘physis’ and Rilke’s ‘das Offene’.
Blanchot’s ‘naming the possible, responding to the impossible’ (IC,
48) might even make an excellent summary reformulation of some
of the aims of the deep ecology movement. The deep ecologist Peter
Reed, for instance, argues that a sense of the otherness of nature
may be a better basis for deep ecology than those dubious narra-
tives of an intensifying human identification with the earth found
in Arne Naess and Warwick Fox. In Michael Zimmerman’s words:
‘Encountering the ‘‘austere mystery’’ of dominant nature can reveal
our intrinsic insignificance (. . .). Only by cultivating this difference,
rather than seeking to overcome it through wider identification, can
people retain appropriate respect for the wholly Other.’19 At the
same time, Blanchot’s work refuses, in its very constitution, that
temptation which a deep ecologist never seems able to resist, that
of making a new foundation or absolutist ground out of ‘nature’ or
the ‘earth’.
A World without Impossibility
To conclude I wish to turn to a thought experiment, taken from
Edward O. Wilson’s Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species
(1984). Wilson writes:
Visualize a beautiful and peaceful world, where the horizon is rimmed by snowy
peaks reaching into a perfect sky. In the central valley, waterfalls tumble down
the faces of steep cliffs into a crystalline lake. On the crest of the terminal bluff
sits a house containing food and every technological convenience. Artisans have
worked across the terrain below to create a replica of one of Earth’s landscape
treasures, perhaps a formal garden from late eighteenth-century England, or the
Garden of the Golden Pavilion at Kyoto, marked by an exquisite balance of water,
copse, and trail. The setting is the most visually pleasing that human imagination
can devise. Except for one thing— it contains no life whatever. This world has
always been dead. The vegetation of the garden is artificial, shaped from plastic
and colored by master craftsman down to the last blade and stem. Not a single
microbe floats in the lake or lies dormant in the ground. The only sounds are the
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broken rhythms of the falling water and an occasional whisper of wind through
the plastic trees.20
Such a landscape, corresponding perhaps to some future lunar colony,
is nightmarish. ‘This is a world (. . .) where people would find their
sanity at risk’ (115).
How does this thought experiment relate to Blanchot’s work? As
we have seen, Blanchot conceptualizes nature in terms of physis and
the ‘impossibility’ of being. The natural realm is not to be hastily
assimilated to a possible object of human power. Is it not the lack
of ‘impossibility’ in just Blanchot’s sense that renders Wilson’s false
paradise so horrific? ‘[T]he impossible is not there in order to make
thought capitulate, but in order to allow it to announce itself according
to a measure other than that of power’ (IC, 43).
Wilson’s thought experiment helps particularize what is at issue
in Blanchot’s notion of the impossible. Wilson’s pseudo-beautiful
landscape is the physical realization of complex programmes for
so-called ‘artificial life’, that is, self-organizational algorithms that
simulate life-like qualities without actually being alive. Such ‘artificial
life’ might seem ‘impossible’ in the limited sense that no human
brain, unaided, could model and so understand it. Yet it would still
not be impossible in Blanchot’s sense. Even if artificial life were
indistinguishable from the real thing the sense of nightmare remains
and is undeniable.
It is in this respect that Bill McGibben’s polemic The Death of
Nature seems so Blanchotian as an affirmation of and lament for the
impossibility of nature. He argues that ‘we have ended the thing that
has, at least in modern times, defined nature for us— its separation from
human society’.21 Nature as a whole, argues McGibben, is losing its
wildness (its ‘impossibility’) and becoming, however clumsily, part of
the sphere of human fabrication.
In altering the planet’s atmosphere, humanity has rendered even
the most distant mountain winds part of the sphere of human fabri-
cation. ‘Yes, the wind still blows—but no longer from some other
sphere, some inhuman place’ (EN, 49). The rain is likewise altered,
perhaps just slightly chemically, but the sense of rain shifts drastically.
McKibben narrates an experience of disenchantment felt one autumn
when listening to the sound of rushing water in the Adirondack
Mountains:
as I sat there (. . .) and thought about the dry summer we’d just come through,
there was nothing awe-inspiring or instructive, or even lulling, in the fall of water.
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It suddenly seemed less like a waterfall than like a spillway to accommodate the
overflow of a reservoir. (EN, 96)
For people in less remote areas such disenchantments are enacted daily
on the edge of every growing conurbation: a wood of mixed oak
and birch, physically untouched by the major road that has been built
nearby, is trashed nevertheless. Blanchot’s concept of the impossible
is apt as a name for what is suppressed— that which provokes us to
think ‘according to a measure other than that of power’ (IC, 43). Yet,
as the whole planet is transformed into an object of human use and
management, ‘the world outdoors will mean much the same thing as
the world indoors, the hill the same thing as the house’ (EN, 48).
If genetic engineering posits a living organism as a self-replicating
soft machine, it removes the creature from that realm of physis to
which Heidegger had opposed the modern conception of organisms
as merely ‘artefacts that make themselves’ (Pathmarks, 195). Would
coming across a genetically engineered rabbit in the countryside,
McGibben asks, be much different from finding a discarded coke can?
Blanchot offers no counter-politics of human liberation, self-
affirmation or the retrieval of some lost relation to ‘nature’ as ground.
His affirmation of the impossible offers a chastening step sideways,
the cultivation of a force of natality, ‘beginning’ as a discontinuous,
unmeaning and acultural element in the human realm generally, one
that also affirms the uniqueness and singularity of natural phenomena,
of physis. This is the ‘wild’ in the sense of a space outside use,
something which is not part of the realm of human power. As we
saw, Blanchot’s neo-anthropocentrism bears elements of a problematic
human exclusiveness. At the same time his work overall performs a
re-enchantment without mystification of both some human artifacts
and of natural phenomena, touching both with elements of his coldly
non-redemptive notion of the sacred.
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